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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
 Petition for Review of An Order of 
The Board of Immigration Appeals
(A73- 072-961)
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 29, 2004
Before: AMBRO, BECKER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges





This is a petition by Jamil Azad for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ordering Azad deported.  It is difficult to determine from
Azad’s brief the exact scope of his contentions.  However, several challenges are clear. 
First, Azad contends that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s finding that he
    1In 1994 Azad was granted the status of permanent resident based on his 1993 marriage
to Ms. Snyder.  Since the marriage was of less than two years duration at that point, his
status adjustment was on a conditional basis.  See 8 U.S.C. 1186a(g)(1).  To remove the
condition, he was required to file a joint petition (with Ms. Snyder) to establish the bona
fides of the marriage, see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c).
    2There is a stray statement in Azad’s brief about a putative error of the BIA when it
found that Azad made a “voluntary waiver of counsel,” but the allegation is not further
developed, and, at all events, we see no basis for it.
2
is deportable under section 241(a)(1)(D)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(D)(I)(i), as
against the position of the INS that (a) as a conditional permanent resident,1 he failed to
have the condition removed from his status prior to expiration of his two-year status
under section 216 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a, or (b) he was excludable at the time of
the adjustment of his status under section 212(a)(6)(C)(I) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), due to his having engaged in marriage fraud.  Second, Azad maintains
that the administrative record is not sufficiently complete, and that he did not have a full
and fair opportunity to present his relevant evidence before the Immigration Court. 
Related to the latter contention is his allegation that he was prejudiced by evidentiary
rulings and by the intemperate conduct of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). 2 
The administrative record is huge, a product of numerous hearings.  However,
because the parties are fully familiar with the background facts and procedural history we
need not set them forth, and limit our discussion to our ratio decidendi.
With respect to the first issue, we are satisfied that substantial, if not
overwhelming evidence supports the conclusion that Azad committed marriage fraud.   
3Azad sought out several women to “help him out” to obtain lawful permanent residence
status.  Credibility determinations are for the IJ, who made them adversely to Azad.  The
testimony offered by Azad relative to why his marriage to Ms. Snyder fell apart does not
help his case, for the issue is not why the marriage failed but whether the marriage was
entered into by Azad in good faith and not for the purpose of procuring an immigration
benefit.  In sum, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision.
With respect to the second argument, the contention about putative incompleteness
is frivolous; the administrative record is very extensive.  We have read the many pages of
transcript on the basis of which Azad complains that the conduct of the hearing by the IJ
was so unfair to him that it constitutes a violation of due process of law.  However, we
find utterly no basis for Azad’s contention.  To be sure, there were times when the IJ
ruled adversely to Azad, but sometimes he ruled adversely to the government.  There
were times too when the IJ became exasperated with Azad’s counsel for what he
apparently perceived to be overzealous advocacy, typically for pressing points that the IJ
thought had been covered or were immaterial.  But these occasions were not excessive
(and the rulings of the IJ seem justified).  Indeed, such reactions are common among trial
judges of all tribunals and, at all events, do not even begin to approach a due process
violation.  Our review of the record reveals that the IJ was temperate and fair.  There was
no due process violation.
The Petition for Review will be denied.
